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Uncertainty and the Double Dividend Hypothesis 
 
Summary 
This paper examines the double dividend hypothesis in the presence of labour income 
uncertainty. Empirical evidence shows that uncertainty over labour income is 
particularly significant in developing, while not negligible in developed countries. 
Under uncertainty, and assuming incomplete capital markets, the tax system plays a role 
in providing social insurance and a green tax reform influences its effectiveness. We 
show that the increase in environmental tax reduces consumption risk while the 
balanced budget decrease in labour income tax increases income risk. We find that the 
total welfare effect of a green tax reform differs substantially from the case of certainty. 
The critical parameters determining the existence of a second dividend are the lump 
sum transfers, the relative substitutability of the two goods for leisure and the initial tax 
rates relative to their optimal that determine also the response of labour supply to a 
change in the tax mix. 
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Economists have long been advocating the use of environmental policies that
provide economic incentives, on the basis of eﬃciency. More recently, it
has been argued that the eﬃciency beneﬁts of market based policies that
generate revenue, such as environmental taxation, may extend beyond the
environmental area if revenues are used to decrease existing distortionary
taxes, such as labour income taxes.
In this paper we extent the literature on revenue neutral environmental
tax shifts by introducing idiosyncratic uncertainty over income. Our analysis
is founded on the results of both theoretical and empirical literature showing
that labour supply decisions are aﬀected quite strongly by the presence of
uncertainty.1 Based on this evidence, it has been argued that some posi-
tive level of labor income taxation is optimal since it reduces uncertainty.
Uncertainty about labor income is likely to be particularly signiﬁcant in de-
veloping countries, especially where private insurance is unavailable, but it
is not unimportant in developed ones.
Income ﬂuctuations are more common and larger in developing relative to
developed countries. Townsend (1995) provides evidence from three develop-
ing economies indicating that risks are mostly of the idiosyncratic nature and
that only few individuals are able to diversify this risk. Developing and low
income nations cope with hardship mainly through the use of informal insur-
ance systems (for example, household might take children out of school during
bad economic times or depend on reciprocal gift giving arrangements). Re-
cent evidence indicate that these informal insurance arrangements, although
they provide some assistance, they are in general weak and more formal insur-
ance systems through either publicly managed programs or private markets
can improve the social safety net of the economy (Townsend (1994), Morduch
(1999a)). Furthermore, ﬁnancial markets are not well developed to allow in-
dividuals to access capital during bad economic times. Microﬁnance is a
promising new institution that oﬀers funding to low income people to under-
1At the theoretical level, Eaton and Rosen (1980a) and more recently Menezes and
Wang (2005), have shown that labor supply can decrease in response to an increase in
wage rate uncertainty if risk aversion is signiﬁcant. Ormiston and Schlee (1994) show
that an increase in wage uncertainty always lowers aggregate hours of work and increases
expected wage rate in competitive labour markets provided workers are risk averse. Floden
(2006) examines ways in which labour supply can be used to self-insure against labour
income uncertainty. At the empirical level, Low (2005) ﬁnds that younger workers with
higher uncertainty over income, work longer hours than old workers and Parker et. al.
(2005) ﬁnds that self-employed workers, facing higher uncertainty, work longer hours as
well. However, this response of labour supply to uncertainty is for self-insurance purposes
and the longer work hours come at the expense of lower average wages.
2take new entrepreneurial activity and reduce poverty but this alternative also
faces a number of problems (Morduch (2006) and Morduch (1999b)). Chetty
and Looney (2006) show that even when we observe smooth consumption
patterns in low income countries, social insurance could be beneﬁcial since
in many cases "...the smoothness of consumption is the result of high risk
aversion and not eﬃcient private insurance markets." (Chetty and Looney
(2006), p. 2352)
At the theoretical level, Varian (1980) views redistributive taxation as
social insurance. Redistributive taxation does not only generate a more eq-
uitable income distribution but it also improves the allocation of risk bearing.
Taxing uncertain income, transfers some of the risk to the budget constraint
and when risks are idiosyncratic in nature, the aggregate tax revenue be-
comes certain which can be re-distributed back to individuals in the form
of lump sum transfers. A green tax reform policy that uses pollution tax
revenues to reduce further the labour tax could exacerbate the social insur-
ance system especially in developing nations where the role of labour taxes
is limited.2 Therefore, the analysis of green tax reforms under uncertainty
could contribute to the debate on the double dividend hypothesis, especially
in the case of developing countries, where, apart from the high income uncer-
tainty, policy makers have to address signiﬁcant and growing environmental
problems.
The interdependency of environmental taxes with other existing taxes
was ﬁrst examined by Sandmo (1975). However, it was not until the early
90s, that the proposal to use environmental taxation revenues in reducing
labour income taxes appeared in the literature. Since labor income taxation
is distortionary under certainty, its reduction yields a positive welfare eﬀect
which has been termed the revenue recycling eﬀect (see for example, Oates
(1993) and (1995), Pearce (1991), Repetto et al. (1992)). However, increases
in environmental taxes lead to higher prices, and thus, to a reduction in real
wages yielding a negative welfare eﬀect which has been termed as the tax-
interaction term. Because of the increase in prices, the incentive to work may
fall even though labor income taxation is reduced. The overall eﬀect depends
on the departure of the existing taxes from their optimum.3 If the green
tax reform moves existing taxes towards their optimum, there is a “gross
2As noted by Bird and Zolt (2005), even in the current tax systems of developing coun-
tries, the personal income tax system plays a small role in redistributing income and provid-
ing social insurance. Furthermore, many developing countries use currently environmental
taxes to generate revenue for environmental investments instead of reducing labour taxes
(Bluﬀstone (2003)).
3Ballard, Goddeeris and Kim (2005) have shown that the existence of a second dividend
also depends on the speciﬁcation of the preferences’ structure. See also Kim (2002).
3beneﬁt” and the green tax reform yields a double dividend. That is, there is
aw e l f a r eb e n e ﬁt in addition to the expected environmental beneﬁtw h i c hi s
termed as the Pigouvian eﬀect.T h eP i g o u v i a ne ﬀect measures the reduction
in the consumption of the polluting good due to the marginal increase in
the environmental tax, multiplied by the marginal social beneﬁt( m a r g i n a l
environmental damage minus the tax ). However, it has been shown that,
under certain reasonable assumptions, the tax-interaction tends to dominate
the revenue recycling eﬀect, and therefore, there is a "gross cost".4 In such
cases, the sign of the total welfare eﬀect depends on the magnitude of the
Pigouvian eﬀect relative to the “gross cost”. Regardless of whether a second
dividend emerges or not, environmental taxes or auctioned permits have an
advantage over grandfathered permits if the revenues are used to reduce
distortionary taxes.5
The green tax reform literature has also examined the eﬀect of revenue
recycling policies on equity and unemployment.6 The literature indicates
that green tax reform could possibly reduce involuntary unemployment. In
terms of equity, it has been shown that a green tax reform can adversely
aﬀect the income distribution, reducing the possibility of achieving a second
dividend.7 Apart from equity considerations, another reason that justify
labor income taxation is the provision of social insurance. Eaton and Rosen
(1980a) have shown that, when there is uncertainty over labor income and
individuals are risk averse, a tax on labor income is optimal, even in the
presence of lump sum taxation, since it reduces uncertainty. Therefore, a
combination of uniform lump sum taxation and labor income taxation is
optimal. Furthermore, Eaton and Rosen (1980b) ﬁnd that under uncertainty
it is optimal to increase the progressivity of the tax system. Despite the
criticism that this line of work has received,8 it is clear that labor income
4See Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and (1997), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Goul-
der (1995) and (1996) , Parry (1995) and (1996), Christiansen (1996) and Goulder, Parry
and Burtraw (1997). See also the literature review papers by Goulder (1995) and Boven-
berg (1999).
5See the recent study by Parry (2003).
6Bovenberg (1999) and De-Mooij (2000) provide extended reviews of the literature on
equity issues.
7More recently Layard (2006) argues that income taxation could have a corrective
aspect, assuming that people put excessive work eﬀort in an attempt to increase their
income relative to the average. Assuming that individuals’ utility decreases on average
income, the optimal income tax is positive.
8For example Lundholm (1992), critised Eaton and Rosen’s (1980b) assumption that
consumers are (ex ante) homogeneous. According to Lundholm, under this assumption
the tax is a substitute for market insurance. Instead, Lundholm argued that consumers
should diﬀer in productivity type.
4taxation is not completely distortionary under labor income uncertainty.
Although the literature has examined the eﬀects of the green tax reform
on equity and unemployment issues, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no work examining the welfare eﬀects of the green tax reform in the presence
of labour income uncertainty. In the present paper we undertake this task.
The introduction of labour income uncertainty in the model implies that
the government has a role in correcting this distortion, especially when pri-
vate insurance markets are not complete, or, as in some developing countries,
not even present. Therefore, under uncertainty the tax system —labour in-
come and environmental tax— can play a corrective role by reducing the
dispersion of net income and consumption among individuals. In doing so,
both taxes provide some type of insurance, in addition to their respective
primary roles (collecting revenues to ﬁnance the public good and reducing
the environmental externality respectively).
When considering a green tax reform within this framework, one should
take into account its eﬀect on the insurance provision mechanism as well.
In this paper, we mark this eﬀect as social insurance eﬀect. In Section 4,
we decompose this eﬀect into three components. First, the increase in the
pollution tax reduces consumption risk, and thus, adds a positive welfare
eﬀect. Second, the balanced budget reduction of the labour income tax
increases the risk creating thus, a negative welfare eﬀect. The sum of these
two eﬀe c t si sp o s i t i v ei ft h et w oc o n s u m p t i o ng o o d s( o n et h a tp o l l u t e sa n dt h e
other that does not) are equal substitutes for leisure, or the polluting good
is a stronger substitute for leisure. On the contrary, if the polluting good is
as u ﬃciently weaker substitute for leisure relative to the non-polluting good,
the net of these two eﬀects on welfare is ambiguous and could be negative.
Third, the reduction of labor income taxation increases income risk and in
doing so it aﬀects the response of labour supply. When the insurance eﬀect
of labour income taxation is added to the income eﬀect on labour supply, the
wedge between the income and the substitution eﬀect is shortened and under
certain conditions, the response of labour supply to labour income taxation
could even become positive. Thus, the marginal cost of labour taxation
weakens or it could even become a marginal welfare beneﬁt, yielding a shift
in the signs of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects.
The total, not including the Pigouvian, welfare eﬀect of the green tax
reform is ambiguous and depends on the relative substitutability of the dirty
and clean good for leisure and the response of labour supply to a change in the
tax mix. This, in turn, depends on the departure of the initial taxes from
their second best optimum. In Section 5 we show that under uncertainty,
the optimal value of labour income tax is positive even in the presence of
lump-sum taxes, and that the optimal environmental tax exceeds marginal
5environmental damages. Optimal taxation is analyzed within a second best
framework. If before the green tax reform labour income tax is above its
optimal level while the environmental tax is below its optimal level, then
a green tax reform could increase welfare. However, the green tax reform
could result in welfare losses if the labor income tax is below its ﬁrst best
and the environmental tax is close to its ﬁrst best, assuming that lump-sum
taxes/transfers are also available.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the two sections that
follow we specify the model and the structure of households’ decision making.
In Section 4 we examine the interaction between labor and environmental
taxation under uncertainty. In Section 5 we analyze optimal taxation within
a second best framework. Section 6 contains the discussion of results and
concluding remarks.
2T h e m o d e l
On the production side, we assume that labour is the only input in the
production process of the only two consumption goods D and C.B o t h
production processes exhibit constant returns to scale and the markets for
both goods are competitive. We normalize units such that the pre-tax prices
of both goods are unity. Good C is assumed to be the environmentally
clean good. Production and consumption of good D generate emissions that
adversely aﬀect the quality of the environment, π,t h a ti s ,π = Π(D) with
ΠD < 0,w h e r eD =
P
Di and Di is household i’s consumption. We further
assume that, in the absence of regulation, ﬁrms do not internalize any part
of the externality and that the marginal product of labour in both industries
is independent of environmental quality.
We assume that households face uncertainty over their wages when they
decide on their labour supply. Households face diﬀerent risks, and thus, ex-
post earn diﬀerent wages. The wage of household i is denoted by wi,w i t h
t h em e a nw a g er a t ew =
Pn
i=1 wi/n =1normalized to unity. Among the
reasons explaining wage uncertainty are: households are searching for jobs
but they are not sure which type of job, and thus, what wage, they will get;
households are uncertain about their productivity in the job that they will
ﬁnd given their investment in human capital; households face the probability
of losing their current jobs in which case there is uncertainty about their
wage at the new job. Uncertainty over labour income may arise also due to
9In this paper we utilize uniform lump sum transfers and distortionary taxes as a
substitute of market insurance as in the Eaton and Rosen taxation model.
6productivity shocks as well as due to imperfect forecasts of inﬂation.10 Our
paper concentrates on purely idiosyncratic risks, assuming away aggregate
risks.11 We also assume that the market fails to provide insurance due to
moral hazard considerations.12
The government’s function is threefold; to provide a certain amount of
public good; a certain level of environmental quality; and insurance against
wage uncertainty. To serve these functions, the government uses a propor-
tional tax τL, on income inclusive of lump sum transfers, a per unit tax
τD on D, and uniform lump sum transfers/taxes Ω.13 Government’s budget
constraint, expressed in per household terms is:14,15
G = τL[w(T − l) − Ω]+τDD + Ω , (1)
where G = G
n is the public good per household, T−l is the household’s labour
supply, with l denoting leisure, and T time endowment. w = w
n denotes
t h em e a nw a g er a t eo ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o na n dD = D
n the mean consumption
level of the dirty good. Although taxes paid by household i are stochastic,16
government’s budget constraint is non-stochastic, since the government pools
together idiosyncratic risks more eﬃciently.17
10For more details see Eaton and Rosen (1980a)
11In the case of aggregate risk, the government could provide social insurance through
intergenerational risk-sharing arrangement. See for example Gordon and Varian (1988)
12See Arrow (1971), Eaton and Rosen (1980a) and Varian (1980).
13The labor tax is inclusive of lump sum transfers so that it can be made equivalent to
a uniform tax on both commodities. We assume that non-uniform lump sum taxes are
not feasible.
14The system can be viewed as a commodity tax on the dirty good τD and the well
known negative income tax that has two parameters, a constant marginal tax rate τL and
a lump sum transfer, Ω. A negative income tax system is progressive in the sense that
average tax rate rises with gross income.
15One has to be aware that lump sum transfers and high labor taxes could aﬀect ad-
versely the participation rate into the labor market. See Moﬃt (1992) for a literature
review of the eﬀects of the U.S. welfare system on work incentives.
16Household i pays taxes Ti = τDD∗
i + τL [wi(T − l∗) − Ω].T h es u p e r s c r i p t ∗ denotes
household’s optimal choices as functions of the tax structure and household’s wage rate.
The tax revenue each individual pays is stochastic since it depends on the random wage
rate.
17The (strong) law of large numbers guarantees certainty at the aggregate level. The






n as the number of households
increases (n increases), the variance of w approaches zero.
73 Individual Decision Making Process
We assume the following structure regarding households’ decision making
process. Before the realization of the state of nature, households are called
to allocate their time endowment between labour and leisure. After uncer-
tainty is resolved, households make their consumption choices. Households
solve ﬁrst the ex-post problem of demand derivation, and then, taking into
account the demand for good C and D, they solve their ex-ante labour supply
problem. Allowing households to make their decisions in two stages, elimi-
nates the possibility of violating ex post the budget constraint due to wage
uncertainty.
3.1 Ex Post Decisions
Given households ex-ante labor supply decision T − l,a n dt h ee xp o s tw a g e
rate wi, the optimal choices of goods D and C are derived from the utility
maximization problem. Assuming separability between public goods (envi-
ronmental quality and consumption of the public good) and private choices
(of D, C and l), households’ utility is,
u = U(D,C,l)+V (Π(nD),nG) . (2)
The assumption of separability between public goods and private choices,
allow us to derive the labour supply response to the change in the tax mix
without considering changes in the environmental quality. If however, en-
vironmental quality is not separable from leisure and an improvement in
environmental quality stimulates labor supply, then a green tax reform is
more likely to create a second dividend. On the other hand, if environmental
quality and leisure are complements, then a green tax reform will have larger
adverse eﬀects on labour supply and the likelihood of a second dividend di-
minishes. See for example, Schwartz and Repetto (1997). Since the focus
of this paper is to analyze the eﬀe c t so fu n c e r t a i n t yo nt h ed o u b l ed i v i d e n d
hypothesis, we adopt the separability assumption following the main body
of the literature. We make the usual assumptions of a twice diﬀerentiable,
strictly concave utility function, U(.) exhibiting decreasing marginal utility
of consumption so that households are risk averse. Each household is subject
to the budget constraint:18
(1 + τD)D + C =( 1− τL)[w(T − l) − Ω] . (3)
18Note that if the labor tax is set at τL = τ
1+τ where τ is a proportional tax on the
two commodities at equal rates it becomes equivalent to a general comsumption tax.
Substituting for τL yields (1 + τ)(1 + τD)D +( 1+τ)C = w(T − l) − Ω
8The ﬁrst order conditions of households’ constrained utility maximization
problem yield, UD =( 1+τD)UC. The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions
yields the optimal consumption choices as functions of the tax rate on labour
income, the tax rate on D,t h el e i s u r ec h o i c ea n dt h eo b s e r v e dw a g er a t e ,t h a t
is, D = D(τD,τL,w i,l,Ω),a n dC = C(τD,τL,w i,l,Ω). Since the demand
functions depend on the wage rate, they diﬀer across individual households.
3.2 Ex Ante Decisions
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, that is, before the realization of the state of
nature, households derive their optimal choice of labour supply from the max-
imization of the expected utility function subject to the budget constraint,
C =( 1−τL)[w(T − l) − Ω]−(1+τD)D. Substituting the two demand func-
tions, derived in the second stage of the problem, into the expected utility
yields,
E(u)=E [U(D(τD,τL,w i,l,Ω),C(τD,τL,w i,l,Ω),l)] + V (Π(nD),nG) .
The solution of the constrained maximization problem yields the following
ﬁrst order conditions,19






= E(Ul) . (4)
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions yields the optimal choice of leisure
as a function of the tax rates, that is,
l
∗ = l(τD,τL,Ω) . (5)
Finally, we return to the second stage of the game, and substitute the
optimal labour choice into the demand functions to derive the optimal choices






Having determined the optimal choices of households as functions of the
tax rates and the uncertain wage rate, we turn in the next section to derive
the welfare eﬀect of a revenue recycling policy.
19In deriving equation (4), we use the ﬁrst order condition of the second stage maxi-
mization problem, which implies that, E[(UD − (1 + τD)UC) ∂D
∂l ]=E(0∂D
∂l )=0 .
94 Interaction of labor and environmental tax-
ation under wage uncertainty
We assume that at some initial positive level of τL and τD the government
considers a marginal increase in the environmental tax τD within a revenue-
neutral policy. The environmental tax is a corrective tax, in the sense that
it internalizes an existing externality. In the absence of uncertainty, the
proportional labour income tax is distortionary in the sense that it changes
the shadow price of leisure. Under certainty, the literature has identiﬁed three
eﬀects of the revenue recycling policy. The eﬀect of using the revenue from
the corrective taxation to reduce the distortionary labour income tax within a
revenue-neutral policy, is positive and has been termed the revenue recycling
eﬀect. However, corrective taxation is not equivalent to lump sum taxation
since it results in price increases, and thus, leads to distortions in the labour
market, a negative eﬀe c tt h a ti st e r m e dt h etax interaction eﬀect. If the
former eﬀect outweights the latter, environmental taxation generates a double
dividend, that is, an additional positive eﬀect to the intended improvement
in environmental quality, which is termed the Pigouvian eﬀect. However, the
opposite is more likely to be the case as we discussed in the Introduction.
Consider now the case that households do not know with certainty the
return to their labour eﬀort when they make their labour-leisure decisions.
It has been shown that in addition to the distortionary eﬀect associated with
revenue generation, taxation has the positive eﬀect of lowering households’
risks by pooling them across the economy. Thus, changing the tax structure
has an additional eﬀect, hereafter called the social insurance eﬀect.
In order to evaluate the social insurance eﬀect, we need to determine
the total welfare eﬀect of the revenue recycling policy. That is, we want
to account for the direct eﬀect that a change in the environmental tax has
on households’ optimal choices, as well as the indirect eﬀect generated by
the decrease in labour income tax implied by the revenue recycling policy.
We proceed by deriving the total change in τL by totally diﬀerentiating
government’s budget constraint, equation (1). Since we consider a revenue


















dτD is the total balanced budget eﬀect of the revenue
recycling policy on the dirty good. Assuming that the direct dominates the
indirect eﬀect, dD
dτD < 0. The sign of the relative marginal tax revenue from




We combine the household’s and government’s budget constraints from
equations (1) and (3), in which we substitute the household’s optimal choices,
D∗, C∗ and l∗ to obtain its resource constraint,
D
∗ + C
∗ + G = w(T − l
∗) − τL(w − 1)(T − l
∗) − τD(D − D) .( 8 )
Household’s resource constraint is stochastic since it depends on w.T h e
above resource constraint reveals that the government is capable of absorbing
risk at a less cost than the individuals. Thus, households face less risk when
making their labour decisions. Consider a household that gets a bad draw,
that is, w<w. In the presence of labor taxation, the tax acts as an insurance
mechanism in that the individual’s income is more than it would be without
the labor tax system in place, as the second term in the RHS of (8) indicates.
In addition, the bad draw will also reduce consumption of the dirty good
below the average consumption level, that is, D<D,a st h et h i r dt e r mi n
the RHS of (8) indicates and the household will again be better oﬀ relative
to the income level without the tax system. The opposite is true for the
households that get a lucky draw. The tax structure reduces the dispersion
of net income and consumption.20
Households are assumed to maximize their expected utility. Substitut-





∗)] + V (Π(nD),nG) .
We can now derive the total eﬀect of the revenue recycling policy by
diﬀerentiating the expected indirect utility function with respect to the en-












E(UC) as the marginal disutility from
increasing the consumption of the dirty good per unit of expected marginal
utility of the clean good, which for simplicity we term as the marginal exter-
20Furthermore, since prior to uncertainty being resolved individuals have the same skills
and opportunities, labor taxes satisfy horizontal equity. Ex post individuals’ income diﬀers
due to luck and thus, there is ex post inequity. However, given that lump sum transfers
are available, lucky individuals have a higher average tax bill, while unlucky individuals
have a lower average tax bill. This implies that the lucky individuals ﬁnance a relatively
larger fraction of the public good.



















where ρ is the marginal welfare change due to labour taxation per dollar of




(T − l∗) − Ω + τL
∂(T−l∗)







(T − l∗) − Ω + τL
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL | {z }
ρ2
.( 1 0 )
The denominator of (10) is the partial equilibrium change in government’s
revenue due to a marginal change in the labour wage tax rate.23 The numer-
ator is the welfare change from a marginal change in τL.24
In the absence of uncertainty, welfare changes because labour-leisure de-
cisions are aﬀected and the labour income tax is distortionary. Under uncer-
tainty, welfare also changes due to the impact of the policy on the insurance
system. The welfare eﬀect of the change in the social insurance system, aris-
ing from the change in labor taxation, is captured by the second term in
equation (9) as well as by changes in ρ.
We examine ﬁrst the eﬀect that the induced changes of the insurance
system have on ρ. First, since labor taxation falls as a result of the revenue
recycling policy, the social insurance eﬀect due to the absorption of income
risk weakens. This is indicated by the covariance term in the numerator of
ρ, which is negative, that is, cov [UC,w] < 0, which implies that ρ1 < 0.
Second, the value of ρ2 depends on the response of labour supply to a
change in τL,t h a ti s ,o nt h es i g no f
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL . Under certainty, the response
of households’ choice of leisure to a decrease in labor taxation can be de-
composed into an income and a substitution eﬀect. When labor taxation
decreases, after-tax income increases and thus, households move toward a
21For some details in the derivation of (9) see Appendix 1.
22I nt h ec a s eo fc e r t a i n t y ,ρ collapses to ρ2 which equals the M term in Goulder et al.
(1997), page 712, equation (14).
23It is a partial equilibrium eﬀect due to the omission of the eﬀect of labour taxation on
the dirty good. This eﬀect is included in the total eﬀe c to ft h ep o l i c yo nt h ed i r t yg o o d .
24Note that within this framework of tax incidence analysis we examine uncompensated
changes, that is, we consider both income and substitution eﬀects. Thus, the term welfare
c h a n g e si su s e dw i t h i nt h i sf r a m e w o r k .
12higher level of leisure. At the same time though, the shadow price of leisure
increases, and as a result, households substitute away from leisure. Thus, the
overall eﬀect depends on the relative strength of the income and substitution
eﬀects. Within a framework very similar to the one considered in the present
paper, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) show that the substitution dominates
the income eﬀect, that is,
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL < 0, if the elasticity of substitution between
leisure and consumption is greater than one.25 Under this assumption, there
is a marginal welfare cost due to labor income taxation, that is, ρ2 > 0.
Under uncertainty, labour income taxation is not by deﬁnition sub-optimal
and the eﬀect of labor taxation on labour supply has been shown to critically
depend on a number of parameters. A decrease in τL increases uncertainty
which may induce households to choose a higher level of leisure. When this
insurance eﬀect is added to the income eﬀect, the likelihood that households
increase their labour supply in response to an increase in τL is enhanced.
The theoretical literature asserts that an increase in wage uncertainty re-
duces labor supply especially at low initial levels of taxation.26 Eaton and
Rosen (1980a) and (1980b) show that the labour supply response depends on
the relative risk aversion and the share of labor income in consumption ex-
penditure. When labor income is the main source of income, the assumption
of moderate relative risk aversion just above unity suﬃces for labor taxation
to stimulate labor supply. Within the framework of the present paper we
derive similar results. In Appendix 2 we show that, assuming separability
between the choices of leisure and the consumption goods, the response of
labor supply to an increase in the labour tax is positive if the household’s
relative risk aversion parameter exceeds unity, and the after tax income elas-
ticity for good D is low. In such cases, that is when
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL > 0,a ni n c r e a s e
in τL unambiguously yields a marginal welfare beneﬁt, i.e. ρ2 < 0.
Therefore, in the presence of uncertainty, ρ1 < 0, while ρ2 ≷ 0 if
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL ≶
0.A s u ﬃcient condition for ρ = ρ1 + ρ2 < 0 is that
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL > 0 and the

















25See Hausman J.A. (1985) for evidence on an upward sloping labour supply curve.
26Recently, Menezes and Wang (2005) were able to separate the increased wage uncer-
tainty into an income and a substitution eﬀect. They found that an increase in wage un-
certainty has a positive income eﬀect on labour supply because increased wage uncertainty
reduces the certainty equivalent income (assuming leisure is normal). The substitution ef-
fect of an increase in wage uncertainty reduces labour supply reﬂecting the worker’s desire
to decrease uncertainty. Under plausible assumptions on risk aversion they ﬁnd that the
negative substitution eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect.
13marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). Under certainty, in the absence of
externalities (τ∗
D =0 ), and assuming that lump sum taxes are available, rev-
enue raised for public good provision does not require distortionary taxation
(τL =0 ). In such case, the MCPF equals unity. In case that labor income
taxation is used (τL > 0) and assuming
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL < 0,t h e nMCPF >1.T h i s
result is supported by a large body of literature in public ﬁnance.27
While the main body of the literature assumes that labour income taxes
are completely distortionary, some authors have incorporated into the analy-
sis a measure of the distributional gains from labour income taxation.28
Sandmo (1998) argued that the MCPF should not only reﬂect the eﬃciency
losses of taxes due to the distortions they inﬂi c to nm a r k e t sb u ta l s ot h ed i s -
tributional gains obtained. Sandmo showed, in a model with heterogeneous
agents, that if the distributional gains are taken into account, the MCPF
ﬁgure could be less than unity.
In a similar manner, the present paper shows that, in the presence of
uncertainty, if the gains from providing insurance are considered, MCPF
could also be less than unity. The suﬃcient and necessary conditions for
MCPF <1 are the same as those yielding ρ<0.
The above discussion regarding the value of ρ has important implications
on both the revenue recycling and the tax interaction eﬀects as it is evident
from equation (9). If ρ<0 then, contrary to the case of certainty, the
revenue recycling eﬀect is negative (third term in equation (9)). However,
the overall increase in revenue exceeds the marginal welfare beneﬁti m p l y i n g
that −1 <ρ<0 and (1 + ρ) > 0. Furthermore, since the pollution tax
also acts as an insurance device, labor supply might be also stimulated from
the increase in the environmental tax, in which case the tax interaction term
alternates in sign relative to the case of certainty.29 Finally, the increase
in the pollution tax generates a reduction in consumption risk and hence an
additional positive welfare eﬀect as we noted in discussing equation (8). This







under risk aversion is negative and thus, welfare
increases as a result of increased environmental taxation.30
The extent to which a second dividend is realized under uncertainty, de-
pends on the relative magnitude of the three eﬀects we examined above. We
now proceed to compare these eﬀects. Substituting ρ = ρ1+ρ2 and using the
27Ballard and Fullerton (1992) oﬀers a comprehensive review of the literature. See also
Hausman (1985) on the empirical evidence of taxation and labour supply.
28See for example Wilson (1991), Dalby (1998) and Sandmo (1998).
29See Appendix 2 for the conditions under which this possibility arises.
30Risk aversion implies UCC < 0. Thus, as D∗ increases due to a positive state of nature
so does C∗ assuming normal goods and as a result UC falls.
14value of the total induced change in τL from equation (7), the sum of the tax
interaction and revenue raising eﬀects (the last two terms in equation (9))
can be written:
−











The ﬁr s tt e r ms h o w st h ed e c r e a s ei ni n s u r a n c ebe n e ﬁts arising from the labour
income tax reduction. Since the variability of the consumption of the dirty
good arises from the variability of the wage rate, the two covariance terms can
be connected more closely. In order to get more insight into the covariance
eﬀects (ﬁrst term in equation (11) and second term in equation (9)), assume
that the consumption of the dirty good is a linear function of the individual’s
income level, namely: D∗
i = β[wi(T − l∗) − Ω],w h e r eβ is the marginal



















The two covariance terms capture the social insurance eﬀects resulting
from the green tax reform under uncertainty, except from the eﬀect on
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL .
Therefore, these social insurance eﬀects are positive if the propensity to con-
sume the dirty good out of gross labour income is greater than the balance
budget reduction in the labour tax arising from a marginal increase in the



















D,(1−τL) − sD  c












D(1−τL) is the compensated elasticity of demand for the dirty good
with respect to the price of leisure,  c
C,(1−τL) is similarly the elasticity of de-
mand for the clean good with respect to the price of leisure. Furthermore,
sD = D
[(T−l∗)−Ω] and sC = C
[(T−l∗)−Ω] are the shares of the dirty and clean good
respectively in income including lump-sum transfers. given that dD
dτD < 0,
31This is a reasonable assumption since most standard type of utility functions yield
linear relationships with income. Also β would depend on the value of the labour tax and
the Pigouvian tax.








C,(1−τL).32 If G>Ω, that is if the public good is not
ﬁnanced entirely by lump-sum taxes, the social insurance eﬀect is unambigu-
ously positive if D is not a very weak substitute for leisure relative to C.
In such cases, the social insurance eﬀect from increased τD dominates the
decrease in social insurance provision due to the balanced budget reduction
in τL.I fDi sas u ﬃciently weak substitute for leisure, the social insurance
eﬀect could be negative depending on the magnitude of dD
dτD.





present the sum of the tax interaction and revenue raising eﬀects as in the
case of certainty. Following similar steps as in Goulder et al (1997) we can






φD = φD =
 c
D,1−τL − T−l∗
Ω  T−l∗Ω h
sD c




".... is a measure of the degree of substitutability between the dirty good
and leisure relative to to that between aggregate consumption and leisure."
(Goulder et al (1997), p. 713). Substituting expressions (11), (12), (13), (14)





=( τD − μD)
dD













(1 − φD)ρ2D + ρ2τD
dD










C,(1−τL), from equations (13) and (15) we have
β+
dτL
dτD > 0 and φD > 1.T h e r e f o r e ,i fD is not substantially weaker substitute
for leisure relative to C, the social insurance eﬀe c ti sp o s i t i v eSI > 0 and the
32To derive this condition, substitute the values of sD and sC into the ﬁrst term in the




+G = T −l∗.I nt h e
ﬁrst best world where the public good is ﬁnanced entirely by lump-sum taxes (G = Ω)t h e
condition holds as an equality  c
D,(1−τL) =  c
C,(1−τL).
16sum of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects is negative (RR +








C,(1−τL),t h e nβ+
dτL
dτD =0and φD =1 .I nt h i sc a s e
and assuming we start with τD > 0, then the social insurance eﬀect is positive
(SI>0), while the sum of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects is
negative (RR+TI <0) assuming ρ2 > 0, while it is positive (RR+TI >0)
assuming ρ2 < 0. Therefore, if ρ2 < 0 there is a second dividend, while if









Assuming τD =0 , the Pigouvian is the only welfare eﬀect of the green tax








C,(1−τL),w eh a v eβ +
dτL
dτD < 0 and φD < 1.
When D is "suﬃciently" weak substitute for leisure and τD =0 , the social
insurance eﬀect is negative, SI < 0 and the sum of the revenue recycling and
tax interaction eﬀects is positive (RR+TI >0) assuming ρ2 > 0, while it is
negative (RR + TI <0) assuming ρ2 < 0.F o rτD > 0 but relatively small,
the signs of the three eﬀe c t sr e m a i nt h es a m ea sl o n ga st h ed i r e c td o m i n a t e s
t h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect in the numerator of equation (13) and in the RR + TI
term.
MCPF-1 SI eﬀect RR+IT eﬀect Total eﬀect








ρ2 < 0 + + positive
ρ2 > 0 + − ambiguous







C,(1−τL) and τD =0
ρ2 < 0 nil nil does not exist
ρ2 > 0 nil nil does not exist







C,(1−τL) and τD > 0
ρ2 < 0 + + positive
ρ2 > 0 + − ambiguous









ρ2 < 0 − − negative
ρ2 > 0 − + ambiguous
Table 1. Total welfare eﬀect under diﬀerent assumptions about the relative
substitutability of the two goods for leisure.
33Assuming that in the case τD > 0, the direct dominates the indirect eﬀect.
17Table 1 below summarizes the above discussion. In summing up, we ﬁnd
that, in general, the social insurance eﬀect is positive and moves in the same
direction as the sum of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects if
ρ2 < 0 and D is a relatively strong (or equal) substitute for leisure yielding
a second dividend. If ρ2 > 0 and and D is a relatively strong (or equal)
substitute of leisure there is a "gross cost" in terms of RR + TI but this
can be oﬀset by the opposing social insurance eﬀe c t .T h eo n l yc a s ei nw h i c h
there is a "gross cost" including the social insurance eﬀe c ti st h ec a s et h a tD
is a suﬃciently weak substitute and ρ2 < 0. These results diﬀer substantially
from the case of certainty. The critical parameters determining the existence
of a second dividend are the lump sum transfers, the relative substitutability
of the two goods for leisure and the initial tax rates relative to their optimal
values that determine also the response of labour supply to a change in the
tax mix. In the next section we undertake the task of deriving the optimal
tax rates.
5O p t i m a l T a x a t i o n
In the previous Section we show that, starting from some positive values of
τL and τD,t h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect of a revenue recycling policy depends on the
magnitude of the departure of the initial values of taxes from their optimal.
The optimal taxes are determined ex ante, that is, before uncertainty is
resolved. Due to the presence of two types of distortions (uncertainty and
environmental externality) we analyze optimal taxation within a second best
framework.
Recall that, within the framework of our model, the government has three
functions, namely to provide the public good, protect the environment, and
provide insurance against wage uncertainty. The government has three in-
struments: labor income tax, environmental tax and lump sum transfers in
order to achieve the above three goals. Thus, the government chooses τL,
τD and Ω to maximize the household’s indirect expected utility subject to
the revenue constraint. The Lagrangian corresponding to the government’s
constrained maximization problem is,
max
τL,τD,Ω
L = E(W(τD,τL,Ω)) + λ
£
Ω + τL[(T − l
∗) − Ω]+τDD − G
¤
.








































∂Ω > 0.35 R
is deﬁned as the average tax revenue per person, and the subscript v = c
indicates compensated changes.
Using the above conditions we can determine government’s optimal choices.
As a benchmark case, we ﬁrst consider the case of certainty. In this case,
and assuming that government has access to lump sum taxes /transfers, the
environmental externality is optimally internalized by a Pigouvian tax. The
revenues from the Pigouvian tax together with the lump sum taxes sup-
port the provision of the public good. That is, the optimal tax structure is
τ∗
D = μD, τ∗
L =0and τDD +Ω∗ = G. 36,37
We now return to the case of uncertainty over labour income. In this case
it is optimal to set both labour income and environmental taxes positive, that
is, τ∗
D > 0 and τ∗
L > 0, while raising any additional revenue from lump sum
taxes. Because of the existence of environmental externalities, the optimal
environmental tax is positive,38 and exceeds the marginal external damage,
since the environmental tax is also part of the social insurance mechanism.






i < 1,i na no p t i m a l
setting. This is also true in the current setting since the MCPF does not
reﬂect only the eﬃciency loss but it accounts also for the social insurance gain.
As shown in the previous section, MCPF<1. Thus, when public investment
is ﬁnanced on the margin by uniform lump sum taxes it causes labor supply
35Following Ng (1980) we make the assumption that Ψ > 0. Ng (1980) notes that, "...Ψ
is positive (though less than one) .... unless the externality is so strong that an increase
in income actually makes the community worse oﬀ." (p. 747).
36Setting τ∗
D >μ D and τ∗
L =0cannot satisfy the above conditions since the left hand
side of the ﬁrst optimal condition is negative at these values. Furthermore, setting τ∗
D =
0 and τ∗
L =0and raising all funds from lump sum taxation cannot satisfy the above
conditions since the left hand side of the ﬁrst two conditions becomes non-zero at these
values. If we set 0 <τ ∗
D <μ D and τ∗
L > 0 then both conditions cannot be satisﬁed
simultaneously since X<0 for all τ∗
D <μ D.
37Note that the double dividend literature was built under the assumption of no lump
sum taxation. In such a case, Bovenberg and De-Mooij (1994) and (1996) argued that
τD <μ D because the marginal cost of public funds is greater than unity. However, as
correctly pointed out by Fullerton (1997) this result stems from the arbitrary normalization
of the clean good’s price to unity.
38In the absense of externalities, equations (11) and (12) yield τ∗
D =0and τ∗
L > 0.T h e
optimal value of τ∗
L is given by (12) where X =0and Ψ =1 . In this case, labour income
taxation —which is equivalent to a uniform commodity tax on both goods— is set optimally
such as to provide social insurance. The remaining required revenues are raised by lump
sum taxes.
19to increase. This increase in labor eﬀort creates an eﬃciency gain in terms of
increased revenue to ﬁn a n c ep u b l i cg o o d sg i v e nt h ee x i s t e n c eo fa no p t i m a l
wage tax. See Sandmo (1998) for a similar analysis. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to derive analytical solution for the optimal tax rates.
After determining the optimal tax rates, the government should compare
the existing tax rates to their optimal values before it decides wether and to
what extent a revenue neutral policy should be implemented. If the initial
tax rates are such that the labor income tax is below its optimal level, while
the environmental tax is equal to its optimal level, a green tax reform policy
will result in welfare losses. On the contrary, if the environmental tax is below
its optimal value and the labour income tax exceeds its optimal value, a case
which is more possible in reality, a green tax reform will improve welfare.
6 Conclusions
The present paper re-examines the double dividend hypothesis in the pres-
ence of labour income uncertainty. We ﬁnd that starting from some positive
level of environmental and labor income taxation and increasing the former
while decreasing the latter within a revenue neutral policy has the following
eﬀects: First, the increase in environmental taxation yields a positive welfare
eﬀect since it reduces consumption risk, in addition to the Pigouvian eﬀect.
Second, the reduction in labor income taxation weakens social insurance pro-
vision, while in the same time alleviates some of the distortions in the labour
market. The net eﬀect depends on the relative substitutability of the dirty
and clean good for leisure. If D is (not) a suﬃciently weak substitute for
l e i s u r er e l a t i v et oCt h en e te ﬀect is negative (positive). Third, the reduction
of labor income taxation increases risk and in doing so it aﬀects the response
of labour supply which could even become positive. Thus, the reduction in
labour income tax could yield a marginal welfare beneﬁt, reversing the signs
of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects. The total welfare eﬀect
of the green tax reform is ambiguous and depends on the relative substi-
tutability of the dirty and clean good for leisure and the response of labour
supply to a change in the tax mix. This, in turn, depends on the departure
of the initial taxes from their second best optimum. We determine that the
optimal value of both environmental and labor taxation is positive. If the
initial level of the labour income tax is above its optimum, that is, there is
overprovision of social insurance, and the environmental tax below its op-
timum, then a revenue recycling policy will yield a positive welfare eﬀect.
However, a revenue recycling policy will result in welfare losses if the initial
level of labor tax is below its optimum, that is, there is underprovision of
20social insurance, while the environmental tax is close or above its optimum.
The lower is labour income tax relative to its optimum, and the closer is
the environmental tax to its optimum, the larger the welfare losses will be,
assuming the availability of lump-sum taxes.
The analysis of the present paper could be extended in diﬀerent direc-
tions. Given the ambiguity of the total welfare eﬀect in a number of in-
stances, it would be interesting to use empirical simulations to determine
the sign and the size of the total eﬀect under plausible parameter values.
The literature under certainty shows that grandfathered emission permits
policies yield lower welfare since they do not generate a revenue recycling
eﬀect. It would be interesting to check this result in the case of uncertainty.
Finally, as mentioned in the Introduction, recent empirical literature shows
that it could be possible that higher uncertainty over income induces employ-
ees to work longer hours for self-insurance purposes (Low (2005), Parker et
al. (2005) and Floden (2006)). This longer work hours comes at the expense
of lower average wages. In this case, taxation can be seen as a substitute to
self-insurance. Extending our analysis to this direction might provide some
interesting intuition.
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258A p p e n d i c e s
8.1 Appendix 1: Calculations leading to equation (9):
T h eg o v e r n m e n tc h o o s e sτL, τD and Ω to maximize the household’s indirect





∗)) + V (Π(nD),nG) ,
subject to the government constraint: τDD +τLw(T −l∗)+(1−τL)Ω = G.
The Lagrangian corresponding to the above problem is:
L = E(W(τD,τL,Ω)) + λ
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Solving the above four equations will yield τ∗
D,τ ∗
L and Ω∗ and λ
∗..
















































































E(UC) is deﬁned as the marginal external damage under un-
certainty.





























Totally diﬀerentiating the expected utility with respect to the environ-
















































dτD i nt h ea b o v ea n dw ec o l l e c tt e r m sa c -
cordingly we get equation (9) and the deﬁnition of ρ in equation (10).






We can determine the eﬀect of an increase in τL on labor supply by diﬀeren-
tiating the ﬁrst order condition of the labour supply determination (ex-ante)
problem, equation (4) in the main text,
E [UC(C,D,l)(1 − τL)w]=E(Ul(C,D,l)) .
27From the budget constraint we have that, C = M − (1 + τD)D,w h e r eM
denotes the after tax income, M =( 1− τL)[w(T − l∗) − Ω)].A s s u m i n g
separability between the choices of leisure and the consumption goods, the
optimal values of the choice variables are D∗ = D(τD,M), C∗ = C(τD,M),
and l∗ = l(τD,τL,Ω). The separability assumption reduces the ﬁrst order
condition to E [UC(C)(1 − τL)w]=E(Ul(l)), which after substituting the
budget constraint and the optimal values of the choice variables yields,
E [UC [(1 − τL)[w(T − l
∗) − Ω] − (1 + τD)D
∗](1− τL)w]=E(Ul(l
∗)) .










∂ (T − l∗)
∂τL
=0.
Diﬀerentiating the budget constraint C = M − (1 + τD)D(τD,M),w i t h
























where η is the after tax income elasticity of good D. Substituting the above
























































< 0,a n dR =
−
UCC
UC C is the relative risk aversion. The response of labor supply to an
increase in the labour tax is positive, if R> C
C+(1+τD)D(1−η). This condition
holds assuming the risk aversion parameter is greater than unity and the
after tax income elasticity for good D is low (that is, η ≤ 1).
28I nt h ec a s et h a tt h ea f t e rt a xi n c o m ee l a s t i c i t yo ft h ed e m a n df o rg o o dD
is unity, that is, η =1, the sign of the labour supply response to changes in
τL depends only on the relative risk aversion, as in the case of one good (see
Eaton and Rosen (1980a)). We can illustrate this case using a utility function






(1−θ) + vl + V (Π(nD),nG),f o rw h i c hη =1 .





Therefore, in this case
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL > 0 if R = θ>1.
We now turn to derive the response of labour supply to changes in the en-










∂ (T − l)
∂τD
)) = 0 .
Diﬀerentiating the budget constraint C = M − (1 + τD)D(τD,M),w i t h















































where the ﬁrst term within the expected value in the nominator is positive,
while the second term is negative assuming that ∂D
∂τD < 0 for all states of na-
ture. Thus,
∂(T−l∗)
∂τD S 0 if the elasticity of the dirty good with respect to the




∂(1+τD) S −1. In the example of constant relative
risk aversion we used above, the response of labour supply to changed in τD
is,
∂(T−l∗)
∂τD = −(1 − τL)(θ − 1)
E[UCw D
C]
∆ . In this case, the sign of the response
of labour supply to changes in the environmental tax depends solely on the




(1+τD) or the price elasticity of demand for the





θ > −1 if θ = R>1.T h u s
∂(T−l∗)
∂τD > 0,
that is the insurance role of environmental taxation has a positive eﬀect on
labour supply when individuals have a moderate relative risk aversion para-
meter.
298.3 Appendix 3. Derivation of (β + dτL
dτD) and φD
































into the expression (β +
dτL












∂τL v=c − τL
∂D
∂τL v=c − τD
dD
dτD
(T − l∗) − Ω + τL
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL
.( ( A 3 . 1 ) )


















(T − l∗) − Ω + τL
∂(T−l∗)
∂τL






∂(1−τL)v=c is the compensated elasticity of demand
for the dirty good with respect to the price of leisure (1-τL) and is pos-





∂(1−τL)v=c > 0 is the compensated price elasticity of the individual’s
labour supply with respect to the price of leisure.
Diﬀerentiating the expected resource constraint: D + C + G =( T − l∗)
with respect the labour taxation while holding utility constant we get:








.( ( A 3 . 3 ) )









T − l∗ 
c
CτL .( ( A 3 . 4 ) )
Substituting this into the expression β+
dτL
dτD in equation (A3.2), yields equa-
tion (15) in the main body of the paper.
30In a similar way we can express in elasticity form the tax interaction eﬀect,
as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 9 ) ,TI =( 1+ρ2)τL
∂(T−l∗)
∂τD . Simple manipulations of
the deﬁnition of ρ2 yield,
(1 + ρ2)τL = −




Substituting this into the deﬁnition of the tax interaction eﬀect yields,







Utilizing the Slutsky equations from above yields,
































































318.4 Appendix 4. Calculations leading to equations
(16) and (17):
The ﬁrst order conditions of the government’s constrained maximization
problem with respect to τL and Ω yield,

















































































respectively. The subscript v = c indicates compensated changes. Substitut-




























The ﬁrst order conditions of the government’s constrained maximization
problem with respect to τD and Ω yield,

























































The total eﬀects of a change in environmental taxation on the dirty good




























































The ﬁrst order conditions of the government’s constrained maximization
problem with respect to τD and τL yield,39


















Substituting the values of the total eﬀects of a changes in environmental and
labour taxation on the dirty good and labor supply from above, equation
39Notice that had there been no lump sum taxes, this would be the only valid ratio.

























































The ratio of optimal conditions in equation (A4.4) corresponds to equa-
tion (16) in the text, while equation (A4.2) to equation (17) in the text.
Equation (A4.6) is not presented in the main text since lump sum taxes are
available.
40Ng (1980) optimal condition without the covariance terms can be obtained by setting
Ω =0 . We also include in the tax base of income taxation the lump sum compensation to
the household. In order to make it equivalent to a general consumption tax
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